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IV.29. PANDANGAN KONTEMPORER TENTANG FIQH (3/4)
Telaah Problematika hukum Islam di Zaman Modern
Oleh Nurcholish Madjid
BEBERAPA CONTOH PEMIKIRAN KONTEMPORER FIQH
Kita telah pergi sejauh yang diperlukan, untuk membahas
masalah-masalah pokok yang mendasari pemikiran kontemporer
tentang fiqh. Berbagai pemikiran mutakhir tentang fiqh
menegaskan perlunya kesadaran akan pesan dasar Islam sebelum
suatu hukum atau hukuman dilaksanakan. Kesadaran itu dapat
disebut sebagai karakteristik pemikiran fiqh dan hukum Islam
di zaman modern. Di sini akan dikemukakan contoh pemikiran
para intelektual Islam mutakhir, dari tiga tokoh yang
representatif, yaitu Fat'hi 'Utsman (pemimpin redaksi majalah
Islam internasional Arabia yang terbit di London), Muhammad
Asad (salah seorang arsitek dan pemikir konstitusi Negara
Islam Pakistan), dan Ahmad Zaki Yamani (yang pernah menjabat
Menteri Perminyakan Saudi Arabia dan tokoh OPEC yang amat
terkenal).
Fatthi 'Utsman menegaskan, suatu hukum, termasuk yang ada
dalam al-Qur'an dapat dilaksanakan hanya setelah ditegakkannya
keadilan sosial dan tatanan kemasyarakatan yang menjamin
anggotanya untuk tidak melanggar ketentuan yang ditetapkan.
Kami kutipkan dan terjemahkan sepenuhnya pendapat Fat'hi
'Utsman yang relevan, dari bukunya, al-Din li al-Waqi' (Agama
untuk Realita):
Keadilan Sosial sebelum hukuman. Allah menerangkan dalam
Kitab-Nya berbagai hukuman kejahatan (had) seperti, misalnya,
hukum bunuh (qishash) untuk kejahatan pembunuhan, potong
tangan untuk pencurian, dan lain-lainnya. Wajar bahwa Islam
menempuh jalan penetapan hukum-hukum setelah ditempuhnya jalan
pengarahan pikiran melalui aqidah dan pendidikan tingkah laku
melalui prinsip tabadul. Tapi penetapan hukum Islam tidak
pernah disebut kecuali mesti timbul dalam pikiran orang,
gambaran yang mengerikan tentang tangan-tangan buntung dan
jasad-jasad berserakan. Sedangkan yang sebenarnya ialah bahwa
rahmat Allah untuk sekalian alam tidaklah menetapkan hukuman,
kecuali sesudah ditempuh jalan proteksi, sama dengan yang
dikatakan Francis Aveling dalam bukunya ilmu Jiwa Klasik dan
Modern, "Kalau tujuan kita ialah kebaikan masyarakat, maka
tujuan hukuman haruslah proteksi. Dan cara apapun yang dapat
merealisasikan tujuan ini harus dipandang sebagai wajar dari
sudut pandangan sosial. Jadi jika kita dapat mencegah
sebab-sebab dan situasi yang mendorong kejahatan, baik yang
berasal dari lingkungan atau pun dari pribadi sendiri, maka
itulah cara yang ideal yang kita wajib menggunakannya."
Dalam praktek memang telah terjadi berbagai usaha ke
arah ini melalui berbagai pengabdian sosial. Tapi kalau
seandainya seluruh situasi yang berkaitan dengan
lingkungan telah tersedia dengan sebaik-baiknya, maka
tentulah yang tersisa bagi kita ialah memikirkan
sebab-sebab individual yang mendorong orang untuk
melakukan pelanggaran-pelanggaran.
Dari sini kita melihat, Islam ketika menetapkan
pelaksanaan qishash dalam kejahatan pembunuhan, ia
bersama itu juga menetapkan langkah-langkah yang
menjamin hilangnya dorongan-dorongan permusuhan
golongan, kelompok atau perbedaan tingkat sosial. Dan
ketika menetapkan hukuman potong tangan pencuri, maka
Islam tidaklah melakukan hal itu sebelum tegaknya
hak-hak hidup pribadi dan mantapnya tanggung negara
untuk menjamin hak-hak pribadi itu. Dan ketika Islam
menetapkan hukum rajam atau cambuk atas pezina, maka
sesungguhnya ia juga menetapkan kemudahan jalan
perkawinan dan melindungi bagian-bagian privat dari
tubuh dengan menutup aurat dan menjaga penglihatan
mata, serta melarang khalwat (kencan seorang lelaki dan
seorang perempuan yang bukan muhrim, namun tanpa muhrim
perempuan itu). Jadi pengaturan sosial berjalan seiring
atau mendahului penetapan hukuman kejahatan.[29]
Lebih runtut lagi adalah jalan pikiran dan garis argumen
Muhammad Asad. Dalam memberi penjelasan tentang makna yang
lebih mendasar di balik hukuman yang amat keras bagi pencuri
(potong tangan), Asad membuat uraian panjang lebar. (Di sini
kami kutipkan seluruh uraian itu, namun maaf tidak sempat
menerjemahkan):
The extreme severity of this Qur'anic punishment can be
understood only if one bears in mind the fundamental
principle of Islamic Law that no duty (taklif) is ever
imposed on man without his being granted a coresponding
right (haq); and the term "duty" also comprises, in
this context, liability to punishment. Now, among the
inalienable rights of every member of the Islamic
society --Muslim and non-Muslim alike-- is the right to
protection (in every sense of the word) by the
community as a whole. As is evedent from innumerable
Qur'anic ordinances as well as the Prophet's injuctions
forthcoming from authentic Traditions, every citizen is
entitled to a share in the community's economic
resources and thus, to the enjoyment of social
security: in other words, he or she must be assured of
an equitable standard of living commensurate with the
resource at the disposal of the community. For,
although the Qur'an makes it clear that human life
cannot be expressed in terms of physical existence
alone --the ultimate values of life being spiritual in
nature-- the believers are not entitled to look upon
spiritual truths and values as something that could be
divorced from the physical and social factors of human
existence. In short, Islam envisages and demands a
society that provides not only for the spiritual needs
of man, but for his bodily and intellectual needs as
well. It follows, threfore, that --in order to be truly
Islamic-- a society (or a state) must be so constituted
that every individual, man and woman, may enjoy that
minimum of material well-being and security without
which there can be no human dignity, no real freedom
and, in the last resort, no spiritual progress: for,
there can be no real happiness and strength in a
society that permits some of its members to suffer
undeserved want while others have more than the need.
If the whole society suffers privations owing to
circumstances beyond its control (as happened, for
instance, to the Muslim community in the early days of
Islam), such shared privations may become a source of
spiritual strength and, through it, of future
greatness. But if the available resources of a
community are so unevenly distributed that certain
groups within it live in affluence while the majority
of the people are forced to use up all their energies
in search of their daily bread, poverty becomes the
most dangerous enemy of spiritual progress, an
occasionally drives whole communities away from
God-consciousness and into the arms of soul-destroying
materialism. It was undoubtedly this that the Prophet
had in mind when he uttered the warning woeds (quoted
by al-Suyuti in al-Jami al-Saghir), "Proverty may well
turn into a denial of the truth (kafr)." Consequently,
the social legislation of Islam aims at a state of
affair in which every man, woman and child has (a)
enough to eat and wear, (b) an adequate home, (c) equal
opportunities and facilities for education, and (d)
free medical care in health and sickness. A corollary
of these rights is the right to productive and
remunerative work while of working age and in good
health, and a provision (by the community or the state)
of adequate nourishment, shelter, etc. in cases of
disability resulting from illness, widowhood, enforeced
enemployment, old age, or under-age. As already
mentioned, the communal obligation to create such a
comprehensive social security scheme has been laid down
in many Qur'anic verses, and has been amplified and
explained by a great number of the Prophers
commandments. It was the second Caliph, Umar ibn
al-Khattab, who began to translate these ordinances
into a concrete administrative scheme (see Ibn Said,
Tabagat, III/1. 213-217); but after his premature
death, his successors had either the vision nor the
statemanship to continue his unfinished work.
It is against the background of this social security
scheme envisaged by Islam that the Qur'an imposes the
severe sentence of hand-cutting as a deterrent
punishment for robbery. Since, under the circumstances
outlined above, "temptation" cannot be admitted as a
justifiable excuse, and since, in the last resort, the
entire socioeconomic system of Islam is based on the
faith of its adherents, its balance is extremely
delicate and in need of constant, strictly enforced
protection. In a community in which everyone is assured
of full security and social justice, any attempt on the
part of an individual to achieve an easy, unjustified
gain at the expense of other members of the community
must be considered an attack against the system as a
whole, and must be punished as such: and, therefore,
the above ordinance which lays down that the hand of
the thief shall be cut off. One must, however, always
hear in mind the principle mentioned at the beginning
of this note: namely, the absolute interdependence
between man's right and corresponding duties (including
liability to punishment). In a community or state which
neglects or is unable to provide complete social
security for all its members, the temptation to enrich
onself by illegal means often becomes irresistible
--and, consequently, theft cannot and should not be
punished as severely as it should be punished in a
state in which social security is a reality in the full
sense of the woed. If the society is unable to fulfil
its duties with regard to everyone of its memebers, it
has not right to invoke the full sanction of criminal
law (had) against the individual transgressor, but must
confine itself to milder forms of administrative
punishment. (Its was in correct appreciation of this
principle that the great Caliph Umar waived the had of
handcutting in a period of famine which afflicted
Arabia during his reign.) To sum up, one may safely
conclude that the cutting-off of a hand in punishment
for theft is applicable only within the context of an
already existing fully-functioning social security
scheme, and in no other circumstances.[30]
Fiqh sangat erat kaitan dengan Syari'ah, jika bukannya malah
identik (seperti menurut pengertian kebanyakan orang). Ahmad
Zaki Yamani, dalam sebuah risalahnya yang terkenal,
memperjelas persoalan Syari'ah itu dalam kaitannya dengan
hasil karya para ulama terdahulu yang secara keseluruhannya
biasanya dipandang sebagai korpus Hukum Islam. Perhatikanlah
bagaimana Yamani menegaskan, hasil pemikiran ("fiqh" dalam
arti asalnya) para ulama dalam kitab-kitab itu baginya
tidaklah mengikat, karena pemikiran itu tidak lepas dari
tuntutan zaman dan tempat yang lebih spesifik, yang belum
tentu cocok dengan tuntutan zaman kita sekarang. Sama dengan
yang di atas, di sini kami kutipkan sepenuhnya uraian Yamani
(namun, sekali lagi, maaf tidak sempat menerjemahkannya):
The Islamic Shari'a as a phrase has two scope of
meanings. Generally and widely construed, it denotes
everything that has been written by Moslem jurists
throughout the centuries, whether it dealt with
contemporaneous issues of the time or in anticipation
of future ones. The jurists derived their principles
from the Qur'an and the Sunnah (way of action and the
opinions of the Prophet), and from the other sources of
Shari'a such as Ijma' (the consensus of the community
represented by its scholars and learned men), and
public interest considerations. The Shari'a, looked
upon in this wide scope, constitutes a huge Juristic
tradition the value of which depends on the individual
jurist himself, his era, or even the particular problem
confronting him. As such the system has a tremendous
scholastic value to the Moslem, however, it has no
binding authority; since within it one might find
different, and sometimes contradictory principles
resolving the same issues depending on the Juristic
school that propagated the principle. Furthermore, it
cannot have a binding authority since circumstances
that brought about a certain principle might not be in
existence any more, and surely we cannot maintain that
previous Moslem Jurists have anticipated all our
existing contemporary problems. Yet, as I said before
in this wide sense, one cannot deny the Shari'a
scholastic value as an elaborate system of deduction
which should be relied upon for future derivations of
principles.
Construed narrowly, the Shari'a is confined to the
undoubted principles of the Qur'an, to what is true and
valid of the Sunna, and the consensus of the community
represented by its sholars and learned men during a
certain period and regarding a particular problem,
provided such consensus was possible. Viewed as such,
the Shari'a has a binding authority on every Moslem,
and he is obligated to follow and employ it to solve
his affairs ...
The importance of differentiating between the wide and
the narrow scope of Shari'a is evident in countries
that fully implement the system, such as the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia. As I explained earlier, not all the
principles of Shari'a in its wider sense are of a
binding authority, because of certain inherent
difficulties in attempting to harmonize some of them.
Furthermore, one cannot choose one juristic school for
implementation to the exclusion of all others, which
was done in the past, since as a logical consiquence on
would have to maintain the princiles of the other
schools are not valid, or at least, are not worthy of
being followed.
According to the well-known Shari'a principle "the
validity of that on which there is a difference can be
questioned, but not the validity of that on which there
is consensus," it becomes imperative ... to adopt the
narrow meaning of Shari'a, confined to the Qur'an, the
Sunna, and consensus, then, select principles from the
various juristic schools with no exceptions, the
criterion being what is more appropriate to the needs
of that particular country. Such countries could
legislate new solutions for novel problems, deriving
such solutions from the general principles of the
Shariia and considerations of public interest and
communal welfare. [31]
-------------------------------------------- (bersambung 4/4)
Kontekstualisasi Doktrin Islam Dalam Sejarah
Editor: Budhy Munawar-Rachman
Penerbit Yayasan Paramadina
Jln. Metro Pondok Indah
Pondok Indah Plaza I Kav. UA 20-21
Jakarta Selatan
Telp. (021) 7501969, 7501983, 7507173
Fax. (021) 7507174
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